104 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
104 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
# KCA OCSP responder
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Standalone Rust/Axum responder. It reads one full JSON status snapshot per CA
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from S3-compatible object storage, caches it for one second with a single-flight
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refresh, and signs OCSP responses with a delegated responder certificate.
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It has **no KCA database access**, no Redis access, and no KCA master key. It
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only needs:
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- `s3:GetObject` on the configured bucket/prefix;
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- the CA certificate and its KCA CA UUID for each issuer;
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- a delegated OCSP signer certificate and private key for each CA. The
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responder currently accepts RSA-SHA256 and ECDSA P-256 signers in PKCS#8,
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PKCS#1 RSA, or SEC1 EC PEM form.
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## Snapshot layout
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KCA publishes objects as:
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```
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<prefix>/<KCA CA UUID>.json
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```
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Set each issuer's required `ca_id` to the UUID of its CA certificate row in KCA.
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This isolates snapshots when the same public CA certificate exists in multiple
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vaults. The responder validates both this ID and the CA certificate fingerprint
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against every downloaded snapshot.
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KCA publishes these objects when `KCA_OCSP_S3_BUCKET` is configured. The JSON
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contains all certificates issued by that CA, both valid and revoked. The
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responder never infers status from a partial revoked-only list.
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## Upgrading from fingerprint-named snapshots
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Deploy the updated responder with `ca_id` before or together with the updated
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KCA publisher. The responder deliberately does not fall back to legacy
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`<prefix>/<CA certificate SHA-256>.json` objects. Until KCA publishes the new
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objects, OCSP requests return `tryLater`. After verifying the new snapshots,
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the obsolete fingerprint-named objects can be removed.
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## Run locally
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1. Create a config based on `responder.example.yaml`, setting each issuer's
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`ca_id` to its CA certificate UUID in KCA.
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2. Put your CA certificates and delegated signer files where the config points.
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3. Export standard AWS credentials / endpoint variables as needed.
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4. Make the signer key readable by the container user (`65532:65532` in the
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published scratch image), or mount it via a Docker secret.
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5. Run:
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```sh
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OCSP_CONFIG=./responder.yaml cargo run
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```
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The default listen address is `0.0.0.0:2560`.
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The published image is built by Gitea Actions on `release/*` tags:
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```sh
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docker run --rm -p 2560:2560 \
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-v "$PWD/responder.yaml:/etc/ocsp/responder.yaml:ro" \
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-v "$PWD/ca:/etc/ocsp/ca:ro" \
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-v "$PWD/signers:/etc/ocsp/signers:ro" \
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-e AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID -e AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY \
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gitea.woggioni.net/woggioni/kca-ocsp:latest
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```
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It runs `FROM scratch` and contains only a statically linked musl executable
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and a CA bundle for outbound S3 HTTPS. There is no shell or package manager in
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the image.
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## Verify with OpenSSL
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For a CA certificate `ca.crt` and leaf certificate `leaf.crt`:
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```sh
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openssl ocsp \
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-issuer ca.crt \
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-cert leaf.crt \
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-url http://127.0.0.1:2560/ocsp \
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-resp_text \
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-noverify
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```
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`-noverify` skips local trust setup; the response still shows the signature
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algorithm and included responder certificate. For production verification,
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build a trust store containing the CA or validate with your normal PKI tooling.
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## Endpoints
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- `POST /ocsp` — `application/ocsp-request`
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- `GET /ocsp/<base64url-request>` — optional GET form
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- `GET /healthz`
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- `GET /readyz`
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## Cache and availability
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- Per-CA cache TTL: `s3.cache_ttl_ms` (default 1000 ms).
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- Concurrent requests for the same CA share one S3 `GetObject`.
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- If S3 fails, a previously cached snapshot is served for
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`s3.stale_grace_seconds`; otherwise the OCSP response is `tryLater`.
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- With multiple CAs, the TTL is per CA. If you need a global one-request-per-
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second limit across all CAs, that requires a shared rate limiter.
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